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Abstract
The utopia point of a multicriteria optimization problem is the vector
that speci￿es for each criterion the most favourable among the feasible val-
ues. The Euclidean compromise solution in multicriteria optimization is a
solution concept that assigns to a feasible set the alternative with minimal
Euclidean distance to the utopia point. The purpose of this paper is to pro-
vide a characterization of the Euclidean compromise solution. Consistency
plays a crucial role in our approach.
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1. Introduction
Multicriteria optimization extends optimization theory by permitting several ￿
possibly con￿ icting ￿ objective functions, which are to be ￿ optimized￿simulta-
neously. By now an important branch of Operations Research (see Steuer et
al., 1996), it ranges from highly verbal approaches like Larichev and Moshkovich
(1997) to highly mathematical approaches like Sawaragi et al. (1985), and is
known by various other names, including Pareto optimization, vector optimiza-
tion, e¢ cient optimization, and multiobjective optimization. Formally, a multi-
criteria optimization problem can be formulated as
Optimize f1(x);:::;fn(x)
subject to x 2 X;
(1.1)
where X denotes the feasible set of alternatives and n is the number of separate
objective functions fk : X ! R (k = 1;:::;n).
The simultaneous optimization of multiple objective functions suggests the
question: what does it mean to optimize, i.e., what is a good outcome? Di⁄erent
answers to this question lead to di⁄erent ways of solving multicriteria optimization
problems. For detailed descriptions and good introductions to the area, see White
(1982), Yu (1985), and Zeleny (1982).
Yu (1973) introduced compromise solutions, based on the idea of ￿nding a
feasible point that is as close as possible to an ideal outcome. Zeleny (1976, p.
174) even states this informally as an ￿ axiom of choice￿ :
￿Alternatives that are closer to the ideal are preferred to those that
are farther away. To be as close as possible to the perceived ideal is
the rationale of human choice.￿
The ideal point, or utopia point, speci￿es for each objective function sepa-
rately the optimal feasible value. Being ￿close to￿a point, of course, requires the3
speci￿cation of a metric. Yu (1973) concentrates on distance functions de￿ned by
‘p-norms, but possible extensions include the use of di⁄erent norms (cf. Gearhart,
1979) or penalty functions (cf. White, 1984).
Bouyssou et al. (1993) observe that within multicriteria decision making ￿ [a]
systematic axiomatic analysis of decision procedures and algorithms is yet to be
carried out￿ . Yu (1973, 1985) and Freimer and Yu (1976) already indicate several
properties of compromise solutions. In this paper we concentrate on the Euclidean
compromise solution, selecting the feasible point that minimizes the Euclidean
distance to the utopia point. We study the properties of this solution and provide
several axiomatic characterizations: the Euclidean compromise solution is shown
to be the unique solution concept satisfying several of the properties on a domain
of multicriteria optimization problems.
This paper contributes to the economic literature on consistency of solution
concepts. Many characterizations of concepts in areas like cooperative and non-
cooperative game theory, abstract economies, bargaining, and matching theory
rely on a consistency property (see Thomson, 2006, for a detailed overview).
Loosely speaking, consistency entails the following: consider a domain of prob-
lems P and a solution concept ’ that assigns a payo⁄ vector to each problem
in P. Consider a problem P 2 P with a set N of economic agents and let M
be a subset of N. Give agents outside M their payo⁄ according to ’ in P and
consider an appropriately de￿ned ￿reduced problem￿P
’
M 2 P for the remaining
members ￿those in M. The solution concept ’ is consistent if it does not involve
a sudden change of plans: The prescribed allocation to each member of M in the
reduced problem P
’
M is the same as that in the original problem P when ’ is used
to determine allocations in both problems. Lensberg (1988) axiomatizes the Nash
bargaining solution using consistency, calling it multilateral stability. The current
paper uses essentially the same axiom.
The set-up of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains de￿nitions and prelim-
inary results. The domain of choice sets and the Euclidean compromise solution4
are de￿ned in Section 3. Section 4 contains all the properties as well as the main
results; the Euclidean compromise solution is shown to be the unique solution
concept satisfying various sets of the properties. All proofs are in Section 5. Sec-
tion 6 addresses the logical independence of the axioms. We conclude in Section
7, which contains remarks on related literature.
2. Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, N will denote a non-empty, ￿nite set of positive integers
(N ￿ N, N 6= ;, N ￿nite). Let RN denote the jNj-dimensional Euclidean space




denote, respectively, the nonnegative, positive and nonpositive orthants of RN:
For vectors x;y 2 RN, write x = y if x ￿ y 2 RN
+; x > y if x ￿ y 2 RN
++ , and
x ￿ y if x ￿ y 2 RN
+ and x 6= y: Relations 5, ￿, and < are de￿ned analogously.
If x 2 RN and I ￿ N, we denote xI = (xi)i2I. For two sets X;Y ￿ RN, de￿ne
X + Y = fx + y j x 2 X;y 2 Y g. If x 2 RN, we will abuse notation slightly and
sometimes write x + Y instead of fxg + Y .
Let S ￿ RN. A point x 2 S is Pareto optimal in S if there is no y 2 S such
that y ￿ x. The set of Pareto optimal points of S is denoted by
PO(S) = fx 2 S j if y 2 R
N and y ￿ x, then y = 2 Sg:
The comprehensive hull of S is the set
comp(S) = fy 2 R
N j y 5 x for some x 2 Sg:
The inner product of two vectors x;y 2 RN is denoted by hx;yi =
P
i2N xiyi
and the Euclidean norm of x 2 RN is kxk =
p
hx;xi. The (closed) ball centered
at x 2 RN with radius r > 0 is denoted B(x;r):
B(x;r) = fy 2 R
N j ky ￿ xk 5 rg:5
Remark 1. Let y 2 B(x;r) with ky ￿ xk = r. We often use the fact that
fz 2 R
N j hx ￿ y;zi = hx ￿ y;yig
is the unique hyperplane supporting the ball B(x;r) at the point y.
For x;y 2 RN, de￿ne the vector obtained by coordinatewise multiplication
x ￿ y 2 RN by (x ￿ y)i = xiyi for each i 2 N. For a set S ￿ RN and an x 2 RN,
x￿S = fx￿s j s 2 Sg. For x 2 RN
++, de￿ne the vector obtained by coordinate-wise
reciprocals x￿1 2 RN by (x￿1)i = 1
xi for all i 2 N.
For a normal h 2 RN and a number a 2 R, the hyperplane H(h;a) and
corresponding halfspace H￿(h;a) are de￿ned as follows:
H(h;a) = fx 2 R
N j hh;xi = ag;
H
￿(h;a) = fx 2 R
N j hh;xi 5 ag:
Remark 2. If h;b 2 RN
++ and a 2 R, then it is straightforward to verify that
b ￿ H￿(h;a) = H￿(h ￿ b￿1;a).
Let jNj = 2 and consider a coordinate i 2 N. The function that projects each
x 2 RN onto RNni by omitting the coordinate indexed by i is denoted by p￿i.1 If
S ￿ RN, then
p￿i(S) := fp￿i(s) j s 2 Sg ￿ R
Nni:
3. The Euclidean compromise solution
We identify alternatives with their evaluations according to pertinent criteria.
Hence, an alternative is a vector x 2 RN, where the coordinate xk (k 2 N)
indicates how alternative x is evaluated according to criterion k. It is assumed
throughout that larger values are preferred to smaller values for each criterion.
1Throughout this paper, we will write Nni instead of the technically correct Nnfig as we
believe this does not introduce confusion, but makes things look less cluttered.6
The Euclidean compromise solution assigns to a feasible set of alternatives the
alternative with minimal Euclidean distance to the utopia point. The feasible sets
are those that are expressible as the comprehensive hull of a nonempty, compact,
and convex set. Formally, de￿ne
￿
N = fS ￿ R
N j S = comp(C) for some nonempty, compact, convex C ￿ R
Ng:
The collection of all choice sets is denoted
￿ = [N￿N, N6=;, N ￿nite ￿
N:
The utopia point u(S) of S 2 ￿N is the point in RN that speci￿es for each
criterion separately the highest achievable value:
ui(S) = max
s2S
si for each i 2 N:
Because S = comp(C) for some nonempty, compact, convex C ￿ RN, the utopia
point is well-de￿ned. Indeed, it is straightforward to prove that u(S) = u(C).
The choice sets with utopia point equal to the zero vector will play an important
role in our axiomatization.
￿
N
0 = fS 2 ￿
N j u(S) = 0g;
￿0 = [N￿N, N6=;, N ￿nite ￿
N
0 :
A solution on ￿ is a function ’ on ￿ that assigns to each choice set S 2 ￿ a
feasible point ’(S) 2 S. The Euclidean compromise solution or Yu solution (cf.
Yu, 1973) is the solution Y that assigns to each S 2 ￿ the feasible point closest
to the utopia point u(S), i.e.,
Y (S) = argmin
s2S
ku(S) ￿ sk:
Geometrically, Y (S) is the projection of the point u(S) onto the set S. The
function Y is well-de￿ned. This can be seen as follows. If u(S) 2 S, then Y (S) =7
u(S). Otherwise, let y 2 S. Since the point in S that is closest to u(S) cannot
be further away than y is, to ￿nd Y (S), it su¢ ces to ￿nd the point s in S \
B(u(S);ku(S)￿yk) that minimizes ku(S)￿sk. Such a point exists and is unique
because S \ B(u(S);ku(S) ￿ yk) is a nonempty, compact, and convex set and,
moreover, s 7! ku(S) ￿ sjj is a continuous function that is strictly convex.
4. Axiomatization of the Euclidean compromise solution
We start this section by introducing several properties of solution concepts. Let
’ be a solution on ￿ and consider the following axioms.
Pareto Optimality (PO): ’(S) 2 PO(S) for all S 2 ￿.
Translation Invariance (T.INV): If S 2 ￿N and x 2 RN; then
’(S + x) = ’(S) + x:
Symmetry (SYM): If S 2 ￿N and if ￿(S) = S for each permutation
￿ of N, then ’i(S) = ’j(S) for all i;j 2 N:
u-Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (u-IIA): Suppose that
S;T 2 ￿N with S ￿ T and u(S) = u(T): Then ’(T) 2 S implies
’(S) = ’(T):
The preceeding four axioms can be found in Yu (1973, 1985) and Freimer and
Yu (1976). The axioms PO, T.INV, and SYM are obvious translations of Nash￿ s
axioms from bargaining theory to the choice problem framework. Furthermore, u-
IIA is the natural adaptation of Nash￿ s original IIA axiom for bargaining problems
to the choice framework with the disagreement point d replaced by the utopia point
u(S).
Other important properties in the game theoretic literature on bargaining (cf.
Nash (1950) and Roth (1985)) are proportionality properties such as scale co-
variance. Conley et al. (2008) exploit the duality between bargaining problems8
and multi-criteria optimization problems and they formulate a proportional losses
axiom for multi-criteria optimization problems that is inspired by scale covariance.
Proportional Losses (P.LOSS): Suppose S 2 ￿N is such that
PO(S) = H(h;a) \ [u(S) ￿ RN
+] for some h 2 RN
++ and a 2 R. Then
for any ￿ 2 RN
++ and all i;j 2 N
￿i[ui(￿￿S)￿’i(￿￿S)][uj(S)￿’j(S)] = ￿j[uj(￿￿S)￿’j(￿￿S)][ui(S)￿’i(S)]:
The proportional losses axiom indicates how a solution reacts to rescaling the
coordinates of choice sets whose Pareto frontier is part of a hyperplane with a
positive normal. If such a choice set S is rescaled by a ￿ 2 RN
++ with ￿i=￿j = 2,
then according to P.LOSS,
ui(￿ ￿ S) ￿ ’i(￿ ￿ S)








Hence, the loss relative to the utopia point measured in criterion i relative to that
in criterion j in the re-scaled choice set ￿￿S should be half the loss relative to the
utopia point measured in criterion i relative to that in criterion j in the original
choice set S: Therefore, if the unit of measurement of an objective doubles, then
the relative loss in this objective as measured in the new units halves compared
to that as measured in the old units. A weaker form of P.LOSS is
Scaling (SCA): Suppose S 2 ￿N is of the form S = fx 2 RN
￿ j
P
i2N xi 5 ag for some a 2 R, a < 0. Then for any ￿ 2 RN
++ and all
i;j 2 N
￿i’j(S)’i(￿ ￿ S) = ￿j’i(S)’j(￿ ￿ S):
The scaling axiom imposes more restrictions on the choice sets than P.LOSS and
is a weaker axiom: P.LOSS implies SCA. To see this suppose that a 2 R, a < 0
and S = fx 2 RN
￿ j
P
i2N xi 5 ag: Then





xi = ag = H(h;a) \ [￿R
N
+];9
where h = (1;::;1) 2 RN
++. Since ui(S) = 0 for each i 2 N, it follows that
S satis￿es the conditions in P.LOSS. The conclusion now follows from the obser-
vation that for any ￿ 2 RN
++ it holds that ui(￿ ￿ S) = 0 for each i 2 N.
Central to our axiomatization of the Euclidean compromise solution is a con-
sistency axiom that to the best of our knowledge has not been considered by any
other authors before in a setting of multi-criteria optimization problems.
u-Consistency (u-CONS): Let S 2 ￿N and I ￿ N, and de￿ne
S
’
I 2 ￿I by
S
’
I := fs 2 R
I j (s;’NnI(S)) 2 Sg:
If ui(S
’
I ) = ui(S) for each i 2 I; then ’i(S
’
I ) = ’i(S) for each i 2 I:
In the statement of u-CONS, the jIj-coordinate choice set S
’
I is the reduced prob-
lem alluded to in the introduction. It is the set of feasible criterion values for
the subset of criteria I after the criteria outside I have been ￿xed at their values
according to ’: Part (e) of Lemma 1 (which appears in Section 5) guarantees
that S
’
I 2 ￿, so that we can apply ’ to the reduced choice set. Suppose that the
utopia levels of the criteria in I are the same in the reduced choice set S
’
I as in the
original choice set S. Then u-consistency requires that the solution prescribes the
same values for the criteria in I in both choice sets. A weaker version of u-CONS
that applies only to subsets of N obtained by deleting exactly one player, is
Weak u-Consistency (W.u-CONS): Let S 2 ￿N and i 2 N, and
de￿ne S
’
￿i 2 ￿Nni by
S
’
￿i := fs 2 R
Nni j (s;’i(S)) 2 Sg:
If u(S
’
￿i) = p￿i(u(S)); then ’(S
’
￿i) = p￿i(’(S)):
We can now state the ￿rst result of this paper.10
Theorem 1. The Euclidean compromise solution is the unique solution on ￿
satisfying PO, T.INV, SYM, u-IIA, SCA, and u-CONS.
Theorem 1 di⁄ers from the axiomatization of the Euclidean compromise so-
lution in Conley et al. (2008) in two respects. Theorem 1 uses SCA instead of
the stronger P.LOSS and, more importantly, it uses u-CONS instead of continuity
(with respect to the Hausdor⁄ metric). Consequently, the axiomatizations are
quite di⁄erent: consistency links the solutions for feasible sets for di⁄erent player
sets, whereas continuity links the solutions for feasible sets for a ￿xed player set.
An alternative axiomatization is possible using a variant of the scaling axiom
which we state next.




i2N xi 5 ag for some a 2 R, a < 0. Then for any ￿ 2 RN
++ and all i;j 2 N
￿i’i(￿ ￿ S) = ￿j’j(￿ ￿ S):
SCA and S.SCA are not logically nested but are equivalent in the presence of
SYM (see Lemma 2 in Section 5). Note that S.SCA implies that ’i(S) = ’j(S)
for the special set S in the statement of the axiom (simply let ￿ = (1;:::;1)) and
this is just the right amount of symmetry needed to characterize the compromise
solution. In particular, S.SCA can be used in place of SYM and SCA in the
statement of Theorem 1 to obtain the next result.
Theorem 2. The Euclidean compromise solution is the unique solution on ￿
satisfying PO, T.INV, u-IIA, S.SCA, and u-CONS.
An axiomatization di⁄erent from that presented in Theorems 1 and 2 is also
possible using the following variation on the theme of consistency.
Projection (PROJ): Suppose that S 2 ￿N
0 . If for some i 2 N it
holds that si = 0 for all s 2 PO(S); then ’i(S) = 0 and ’(p￿i(S)) =
p￿i(’(S)):11
The projection axiom requires that ’ satisfy a consistency-like property when
restricted to a special class of choice sets in which criterion i attains the same value
at any Pareto optimal alternative. For such choice sets, the solution prescribes
alternatives in which criterion i is maintained at its constant Pareto-optimal level,
whereas the levels of the other criteria can be found from the lower-dimensional
choice set that is obtained by disregarding criterion i. The very mild partial Pareto
optimality requirement embodied in PROJ on a very restricted class of problems
is enough to characterize the Euclidean compromise solution without requiring
PO as an explicit axiom.
Theorem 3. The Euclidean compromise solution is the unique solution on ￿
satisfying T.INV, SYM, u-IIA, SCA, and PROJ.
Finally, we can replace SYM and SCA in Theorem 3 with S.SCA and ob-
tain the following axiomatically parsimonious characterization of the Euclidean
compromise solution.
Theorem 4. The Euclidean compromise solution is the unique solution on ￿
satisfying T.INV, u-IIA, S.SCA, and PROJ.
5. Proofs of Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4
The proofs of the four theorems are split up into a sequence of partial results in
order to make the proofs more accessible.
We start by proving two lemmas. The ￿rst indicates that ￿ is closed under
projections, that Pareto optima and utopia vectors are in a sense robust against
projections, and that ￿ is closed under rescaling of its coordinates or reduction.
Mostly, the proofs of these statements are trivial exercises; we will only provide
the proof of parts (b) and (e).12
Lemma 1. Suppose that jNj = 2, S 2 ￿N, i 2 N, and ￿ 2 RN
++. The following
claims hold:
(a) p￿i(S) 2 ￿Nni.
(b) If PO(S) ￿ fx 2 RN j xi = 0g, then p￿i(PO(S)) = PO(p￿i(S)).
(c) p￿i(u(S)) = u(p￿i(S)).
(d) ￿￿S 2 ￿N.
(e) If I ￿ N, I 6= ;, and s 2 S, then fy 2 RI j (y;sNnI) 2 Sg 2 ￿I.
Proof. To prove part (b), assume that PO(S) ￿ fx 2 RN j xi = 0g.
First, let v 2 p￿i(PO(S)). Then there exists a e v 2 PO(S) such that p￿i(e v) =
v. Suppose v = 2 PO(p￿i(S)). Then w ￿ v for some w 2 p￿i(S). Let e w 2 S be
such that p￿i(e w) = w. Since S 2 ￿, there exists an e x 2 PO(S) such that e x = e w.
Then e v;e x 2 PO(S) implies e vi = e xi = 0 and we also know that p￿i(e x) = p￿i(e w) =
w ￿ v = p￿i(e v). So e x ￿ e v, contradicting e v 2 PO(S). Hence, v 2 PO(p￿i(S)) and
we conclude that p￿i(PO(S)) ￿ PO(p￿i(S)).
Now, let v 2 PO(p￿i(S)). Then there exists a e v 2 S such that p￿i(e v) = v.
Since S 2 ￿, there exists a e w 2 PO(S) such that e w = e v. Then p￿i(e w) 2 p￿i(S)
and p￿i(e w) = p￿i(e v) = v 2 PO(p￿i(S)), so the weak inequality between p￿i(e w)
and p￿i(e v) must be an equality. Since p￿i(e w) 2 p￿i(PO(S)), it follows that v =
p￿i(e v) = p￿i(e w) 2 p￿i(PO(S)) and we conclude that p￿i(PO(S)) ￿ PO(p￿i(S)).
To prove part (e), let I ￿ N, I 6= ;, and s 2 S. Because S 2 ￿N, there
is a nonempty, compact, convex set C ￿ RN such that S = comp(C). Note
that the set e C = fc 2 C j cNnI = sNnIg ￿ RN is nonempty, compact, and
convex as well. These properties are not lost under a projection p￿j for any
j 2 NnI. Therefore, writing NnI = fj(1);:::;j(m)g, we ￿nd that the set b C =13
p￿j(m) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ p￿j(1)(e C) ￿ RI, which is obtained from e C by succesive projections
with respect to the coordinates in NnI, is a nonempty, compact, convex set.
Noting that fy 2 RI j (y;sNnI) 2 Sg = comp(b C) ￿ RI, it follows that fy 2 RI j
(y;sNnI) 2 Sg 2 ￿I.
In the following lemma we explore logical dependencies between the various
axioms.
Lemma 2. Let ’ be a solution on ￿. The following claims hold:
(a) If ’ satis￿es PO, u-IIA, and W.u-CONS, then ’ satis￿es PROJ.
(b) Suppose that ’ satis￿es SYM. Then ’ satis￿es SCA if and only if ’ satis￿es
S.SCA.
Proof. To prove part (a), let S 2 ￿N
0 and i 2 N and suppose that si = 0 for
all s 2 PO(S): Note that ’i(S) = 0 by PO. It remains to show that ’(p￿i(S)) =
p￿i(’(S)): First, note that
S
’
￿i = fs 2 R
Nni j (s;’i(S)) 2 Sg = fs 2 R
Nni j (s;0) 2 Sg:
Hence, u(S
’
￿i) = p￿i(u(S)). Also, by Lemma 1 (c), it holds that p￿i(u(S)) =




By de￿nition of S
’




Next, we show that PO(p￿i(S)) ￿ S
’
￿i and that this implies ’(p￿i(S)) 2 S
’
￿i.
Choose v 2 PO(p￿i(S)): Then there exists a ~ v 2 S such that p￿i(~ v) = v: In
addition, there exists a ~ w 2 PO(S) such that ~ w = ~ v; from which it follows that14
p￿i(~ w) 2 p￿i(S) and p￿i(~ w) = p￿i(~ v) = v: Since v 2 PO(p￿i(S)); we conclude
that p￿i(~ w) = v: Since si = 0 for all s 2 PO(S); it follows that ~ wi = 0 and
therefore (v;0) 2 S and v 2 S
’
￿i: This proves that PO(p￿i(S)) ￿ S
’
￿i: We can





Summarizing, we have u(S
’
￿i) = u(p￿i(S)), S
’
￿i ￿ p￿i(S), and ’(p￿i(S)) 2 S
’
￿i:










Therefore, ’(p￿i(S)) = p￿i(’(S)) and the proof of part (a) is complete.
To prove part (b), suppose that ’ satis￿es SYM. De￿ne S = fx 2 RN
￿ j
P
i2N xi 5 ag with a < 0 and choose ￿ 2 RN
++: Applying SYM to the set S, it
follows that ’(S) = ￿(1;:::;1) for some real number ￿: Furthermore, ’(S) 2 S
since ’ is a solution. Observing that 0 = 2 S (since a < 0); we deduce that ￿ < 0;
and consequently, that ’i(S) = ￿ 6= 0 for all i 2 N: For each i;j, it follows that
￿i’j(S)’i(￿ ￿ S) = ￿j’i(S)’j(￿ ￿ S)
if and only if
￿i’i(￿ ￿ S) = ￿j’j(￿ ￿ S):
This proves that ’ satis￿es SCA if and only if ’ satis￿es S.SCA, and the proof is
complete.
We are now set to prove that the Euclidean compromise solution satis￿es all
the axioms introduced in Section 4.15
Proposition 3. The Euclidean compromise solution satis￿es PO, T.INV, SYM,
u-IIA, P.LOSS, SCA, S.SCA, u-CONS, W.u-CONS, and PROJ.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the Euclidean compromise solution
satis￿es PO, T.INV, SYM and u-IIA. Conley et al. (2008) show that the Euclidean
compromise solution satis￿es P.LOSS, from which it follows that it also satis￿es
the weaker SCA. Since SCA and SYM are satis￿ed, it follows from Lemma 2(b)
that S.SCA is satis￿ed.
To see that the Euclidean compromise solution Y satis￿es u-CONS, let S 2 ￿N
and I ￿ N and suppose that ui(SY
I ) = ui(S) for each i 2 I. It follows that
(u(SY
I );uNnI(S)) = u(S). Also, by de￿nition of SY
I , it holds that t 2 SY
I if and only
if (t;YNnI(S)) 2 S. Using this, we deduce that s 2 S solves mins2S ku(S) ￿ sk if
and only if sI solves mint2SY
I k(u(SY




I ) ￿ tk = argmint2SY
I k(u(SY
I );uNnI(S)) ￿ (t;YNnI(S))k. This
shows that Yi(SY
I ) = Yi(S) for each i 2 I.
Since u-CONS implies the weaker W.u-CONS, we can now can deduce from
Lemma 2 that the Euclidean compromise solution satis￿es PROJ.
Proposition 3 and Lemma 2(a) imply that Theorem 1 is an immediate conse-
quence of Theorem 3 and that Theorem 2 is an immediate consequence of Theorem
4. In addition, SYM and SCA imply S.SCA as a consequence of Lemma 2(b), so
Theorem 3 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4. Hence, the remainder of
this section is devoted to proving Theorem 4. We begin by proving that two of
the four properties in that theorem imply that a solution concept selects a Pareto
optimal feasible point for certain choice sets.
Lemma 4. Let ’ be a solution on ￿ that satis￿es u-IIA and S.SCA. Suppose
that jNj = 2, h 2 RN
++, a 2 R, a < 0, and
A = fx 2 R
N j x 5 0 and hh;xi 5 ag:
Then ’(A) 2 PO(A).16
Proof. Let B = h ￿ A. Remark 2 implies that
B = fx 2 R




Because A = h￿1 ￿B, it follows from S.SCA applied to ’ (with h￿1 in the role of
￿ and B in the role of S) that
8i;j 2 N : ’i(A)hj = ’j(A)hi:
Since 0 = 2 A; it follows that ’(A) < 0 implying that
’(A) = ￿h for some ￿ 2 R, ￿ < 0: (5.1)
Suppose that ’(A) = 2 PO(A), which implies that
P
i2N hi’i(A) < a. We will
derive a contradiction. Fix some i 2 N. Using (5.1) and h 2 RN










++ by ￿j := 1 for all j 6= i and ￿i := 1
c. Consider the choice set C = ￿ ￿ A.
Notice that u(C) = ￿ ￿ u(A) = 0. By Remark 2,
C = fx 2 R




























which proves that ’(A) 2 C. Consequently, u-IIA of ’ and (5.1) imply that
’(C) = ’(A) = ￿h: (5.2)17
On the other hand, notice that (h￿1 ￿ ￿) ￿ B = (h￿1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (h ￿ A) = ￿ ￿ A = C.

















where the ￿rst two equalities follow from (5.2), the third from (h￿1 ￿ ￿) ￿ B = C
and S.SCA applied to ’ (with h￿1￿￿ in the role of ￿ and B in the role of S), and
the fourth from the de￿nition of ￿: This is impossible since c 6= 1 and we conclude
that ’(A) 2 PO(A).
Lemma 4 shows that Pareto optimality on a small set of multicriteria opti-
mization problems is implied by other axioms. This is reminiscent of a result of
Roth (1977), where he shows that the axiom of Pareto optimality in Nash￿ s (1950)
formulation of the bargaining problem is implied by a number of other axioms.
We now proceed to study choice sets in which the utopia outcome equals the
zero vector and is actually feasible. If this is the case, the utopia outcome is
selected by a solution concept satisfying PROJ.
Proposition 5. Let ’ be a solution concept on ￿ that satis￿es PROJ. Let S 2 ￿0
be such that u(S) 2 S. Then ’(S) = u(S) = Y (S).
Proof. Obviously, u(S) 2 S implies that Y (S) = u(S). We proceed by showing
that ’(S) = u(S). Since u(S) = s for each s 2 S, u(S) 2 S implies PO(S) =
fu(S)g.
Let N be such that S 2 ￿N
0 and discern two cases:
Case 1: If jNj = 2, then PO(S) = fu(S)g = f0g and PROJ of ’ imply that
’i(S) = 0 for each i 2 N, so that ’(S) = 0 = u(S).
Case 2: If jNj = 1, consider the set T = S￿f0g = f(s;0) 2 R2 j s 2 Sg 2 ￿2.
Then u(S) = 0 2 S implies that u(T) = (u(S);0) = (0;0) 2 T and PO(T) =
f(0;0)g: It follows that ’(S) = p￿2(’(T)) = p￿2((0;0)) = 0 = u(S), where the18
￿rst equality holds by applying PROJ with respect to the second coordinate of
T, and the second equality holds since ’(T) = u(T) = (0;0) by case 1. Hence
’(S) = u(S), as was to be shown.
In the next Proposition we show that in choice sets with utopia point zero
and a Euclidean compromise solution which is smaller in each coordinate than
the utopia point, every solution concept satisfying two of the four properties in
Theorem 4 coincides with the Euclidean compromise solution.
Proposition 6. Let ’ be a solution concept on ￿ that satis￿es u-IIA and S.SCA.
Suppose that S 2 ￿0 satis￿es Y (S) < u(S). Then ’(S) = Y (S).
Proof. Let N be such that S 2 ￿N
0 . Because u(S) = 0, we know that Y (S) <
u(S) = 0. Note that this implies that jNj = 2. By de￿nition of Y (S), the choice
set S and the ball B(0;kY (S)k) around the utopia point u(S) = 0 with radius
kY (S)k have only the point Y (S) in common. By the separating hyperplane
theorem, there exists a hyperplane that separates the ball B(0;kY (S)k) and S,
supporting the ball at Y (S). By Remark 1, this is the hyperplane H(h;a) with
h = u(S) ￿ Y (S) = ￿Y (S) > 0 and a = ￿khk
2 < 0:
The choice set S lies in the halfspace H￿(h;a) = fx 2 RN j hh;xi 5 ag. The
choice set
A = fx 2 R
N j x 5 0 and hh;xi 5 ag
satis￿es
S ￿ A and u(S) = u(A) = 0:
By Remark 2,
B := h ￿ A = fx 2 R




Notice that u(B) = h ￿ u(A) = h ￿ 0 = 0 = 2 B, because a < 0. Applying S.SCA
with S = B;￿ = h￿1 2 RN
++; and A = h￿1 ￿ B, it follows that
8i;j 2 N : ’i(A)hj = ’j(A)hi:




jjhjj2h = ￿h = Y (S):
Since S ￿ A, u(S) = u(A) = 0, and ’(A) = Y (S) 2 S, it follows from u-IIA of ’
that ’(S) = ’(A) = Y (S).
We proceed by considering choice sets in ￿0 for which the Euclidean com-
promise solution has some, but not all, coordinates equal to the corresponding
coordinates of the utopia point. On such choice sets, solution concepts satisfying
u-IIA, PROJ, and S.SCA coincide with the Euclidean compromise solution.
Proposition 7. Let ’ be a solution concept on ￿ that satis￿es u-IIA, PROJ,
and S.SCA. Suppose that S 2 ￿0 satis￿es Y (S) ￿ u(S), but not Y (S) < u(S).
Then ’(S) = Y (S).
Proof. Let N be such that S 2 ￿N
0 . Note that Y (S) ￿ u(S), but not Y (S) <
u(S), implies that jNj = 2. As in the proof of Proposition 6, we deduce that the
unique tangent hyperplane H(h;a) separating the sets S and B(0;kY (S)k) has
normal h = ￿Y (S) and a = ￿kY (S)k2. De￿ne
T = fx 2 R
N j x 5 0 and hh;xi 5 ag 2 ￿
N:
Then
S ￿ T, u(S) = u(T) = 0, and Y (S) = Y (T): (5.3)
The equality Y (S) = Y (T) follows from the fact that by construction the ball
B(0;kY (S)k) and T have exactly the point Y (S) in common. It su¢ ces to prove
that
’(T) = Y (T); (5.4)20
since (5.3), (5.4), and u-IIA of ’ then imply ’(S) = ’(T) = Y (T) = Y (S), which
was to be shown.
By assumption, the set
I = fi 2 N j Yi(S) = ui(S)g = fi 2 N j Yi(T) = ui(T)g = fi 2 N j hi = 0g
is nonempty. It follows that T = fx 2 RN j x 5 0 and
P
j2NnI hjxj 5 ag, so that
8i 2 I : PO(T) ￿ fx 2 R
N j xi = 0g: (5.5)
By (5.5), PO of Y , and PROJ of ’, we know
8i 2 I : ’i(T) = Yi(T) = 0: (5.6)
Lemma 1 (b) and (c) and PROJ of Y imply that for each i 2 I
p￿i(PO(T)) = PO(p￿i(T));
p￿i(u(T)) = u(p￿i(T));
p￿i(Y (T)) = Y (p￿i(T)):
Whereas the set T has jIj coordinates i for which Yi(T) = ui(T), the choice set
p￿i(T) has only jIj ￿ 1 such coordinates when i 2 I. Repeated application of
projection reduces this number to zero: Write I = fi(1);:::;i(m)g and take
V = p￿i(m) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ p￿i(1)(T);
the choice set in ￿
NnI
0 obtained from T by successive projection with respect to
the coordinates in I. Then the set of coordinates j for which Yj(V ) = uj(V ) is
empty, so that Y (V ) < u(V ). Since the Euclidean compromise solution selects the
utopia point in one-dimensional choice sets, this implies that V 2 ￿
NnI
0 must be
a choice set of dimension greater than or equal to two. Proposition 6 and PROJ
of ’ and Y imply
p￿i(m) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ p￿i(1)(Y (T)) = Y (V ) = ’(V ) = p￿i(m) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ p￿i(1)(’(T)): (5.7)21
Equality (5.6) indicates that Yi(T) = ’i(T) if i 2 I and equality (5.7) indicates
that Yi(T) = ’i(T) if i = 2 I, which proves (5.4).
Now we merely have to combine the results obtained.
Proof of Theorem 4. Y satis￿es T.INV, u-IIA, S.SCA, and PROJ by Proposi-
tion 3. Let ’ be a solution concept on ￿ that also satis￿es these four properties.
Let S 2 ￿ and let T = ￿u(S)+S 2 ￿0. By T.INV of Y and ’, it su¢ ces to show
that ’(T) = Y (T). If u(T) 2 T, this follows from Proposition 5. If Y (T) < u(T),
it follows from Proposition 6. In all other cases, it follows from Proposition 7.
6. Independence of the axioms
Theorem 4 provides the most parsimonious axiomatization of the Yu solution. In
this section, we establish the logical independence of the properties used to axiom-
atize the Euclidean compromise solution in Theorem 4. To accomplish this, we
construct four alternative solution concepts, each of which violates exactly one of
the four axioms T.INV, u-IIA, S.SCA, and PROJ. Since it is mostly straightfor-
ward to check that the solution concepts that we provide satisfy or violate certain
axioms, we will not go into details. However, all proofs can be obtained from the
authors upon request.
Example 1. Minimization of a weighted generalization of the Yu solution yields
a concept that violates S.SCA. Let fwigi2N be a sequence of positive numbers









The solution concept ’1 satis￿es u-IIA, T.INV, and PROJ, but not S.SCA.22
In the constructions of the remaining examples, we will make use of an auxiliary
solution   on ￿ de￿ned as follows:
8S 2 ￿









Note that   satis￿es u-IIA, T.INV, and PROJ.
Example 2. De￿ne ’2 on ￿ by taking
8S 2 ￿ : ’
2(S) =
(
Y (S) if Y (S) < u(S);
 (S) otherwise.
Solution concept ’2 satis￿es u-IIA, T.INV, and S.SCA, but not PROJ.
Example 3. De￿ne ’3 on ￿ by
8S 2 ￿ : ’
3(S) =
(
Y (S) if S 2 ￿0;
 (S) otherwise.
Solution concept ’3 satis￿es u-IIA, PROJ, and S.SCA, but not T.INV.
Example 4. For jNj = 2 and a 2 R, a < 0, we de￿ne e ￿N;a = fx 2 RN j x 5 0
and
P
i2N xi 5 ag and e ￿ = [a2R, a<0 [N￿N, N ￿nite, jNj=2 e ￿N;a. A choice set S 2 e ￿
has utopia point u(S) = 0.
Let S 2 ￿N with jNj = 2 and I = fi 2 N j xi = yi for all x;y 2 PO(S)g the
collection of coordinates for which all Pareto optimal outcomes of S achieve the
same value. Notice that I = N if and only if u(S) 2 S. If u(S) = 2 S, de￿ne p￿I(S)
to be the set obtained from S by projecting away all coordinates in I. Part (a) of
Lemma 1 implies that p￿I(S) 2 ￿NnI is indeed a choice set.
We say that a set S 2 ￿ reduces to a set in e ￿ if u(S) = 2 S, and there is a
rescaling vector ￿ 2 R
NnI
++ of the coordinates of p￿I(￿u(S)+S) 2 ￿
NnI
0 such that
￿ ￿ p￿I(￿u(S) + S) is in e ￿. Informally, S reduces to a set in e ￿ if u(S) = 2 S and,23
moreover, after translation to a set with utopia point 0, projection, and rescaling
of its coordinates, S yields a set in e ￿.
De￿ne ’4 on ￿ by
8S 2 ￿ : ’
4(S) =
(
Y (S) if S reduces to a set in e ￿;
 (S) otherwise.
Solution concept ’4 satis￿es T.INV, PROJ, and S.SCA, but not u-IIA.
7. Concluding remarks
Bouyssou et al. (1993) promote an axiomatic approach to the study of decision
procedures in multicriteria optimization. In Theorems 1 through 4, we provide
four axiomatic characterizations of the Euclidean compromise solution. Most of
the properties that we use in these axiomatizations, namely PO, u-IIA, SYM,
T.INV, u-CONS, and PROJ, are shared by a larger class of compromise solutions.
For example, suppose that f : R+ ! R is strictly increasing and strictly convex
and for each N and each S 2 ￿N; let





Then   de￿nes a solution on ￿ satisfying PO, u-IIA, SYM, T.INV, u-CONS, and
PROJ. Axioms of "scale covariance" type play an important role in the litera-
ture on bargaining and the axioms P.LOSS, SCA, and S.SCA are proportionality
properties speci￿c to the Euclidean compromise solution.
Consistency properties like u-CONS and PROJ play an essential role in our
characterizations of the Euclidean compromise solution. Such properties allow us
to, under certain circumstances, reduce the feasible set of alternatives to one with
lower dimension. A very di⁄erent characterization, relying on a continuity axiom
instead of a consistency property, is given by Conley et al. (2008). They exploit an
interesting duality between the compromise approach in multicriteria optimization24
and the game theoretic approach to bargaining. The compromise approach entails
formulating a desirable, ideal point (the utopia point) and then ￿ working your
way down￿to a feasible solution as close as possible to the ideal. The bargaining
approach entails formulating a typically undesirable disagreement point and then
￿ working your way up￿to a feasible point dominating the disagreement outcome.
Mixtures of the two approaches, like the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solution, exist
as well.
Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) characterize the solution concept that assigns to
each choice set the point closest to an exogenously given and ￿xed reference point,
rather than the utopia point, which varies as a function of the choice set. Their
axiomatization involves a symmetry condition and independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives. Whereas the symmetry condition in Section 4, taken from Yu (1973),
requires symmetry only in the line through the origin with equal coordinates, the
symmetry condition of Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) applies to choice sets that are
symmetric with respect to any line through the reference point.
P￿ngsten and Wagener (2003) also consider solution concepts de￿ned in terms
of optimal distances from a reference point. Unlike the approach we have taken
in this paper, their reference point is explicitly assumed to be exogenous, as in
Rubinstein and Zhou (1999). In addition, P￿ngsten and Wagener (2003) restrict
the class of solution concepts to those optimizing a distance function and they
employ an axiomatic approach to single out a particular distance function. This
makes their approach very di⁄erent from ours, in that we derive the existence of
a distance function from properties that do not make any reference to distance.
The domain of our solution concepts is the collection of all sets that can be
expressed as the comprehensive hull of a nonempty, compact, and convex subset
of a ￿nite-dimensional Euclidean space. Other authors (e.g., Conley et al. (2008)
and Yu (1973)) have considered the domain of nonempty, compact, and convex
subsets of ￿nite-dimensional Euclidean spaces. We believe that, with appropriate
modi￿cations of the statements of our axioms, we can prove some of our results25
for this domain and we leave this as a topic for future research.
In Yu (1973), a nonsymmetric generalization of the compromise solution was
proposed and this weighted solution was characterized in Conley et al. (2008). A
consistency-based axiomatization of this weighted extension is also possible using
the methods developed in the current paper and we will pursue this in future
work.
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